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This paper explores the recent reform of the French law of unjustified enrichment that was effected through a 
government decree in 2016. It analyses the provisions of both “circles” of enrichment law – recovery of undue payment 
and unjustified enrichment strictly so called – in their historical and comparative context, both in terms of the 





The French law of unjustified enrichment was recently reformed by the Ordonnance (government 
decree) of 10 February 2016 “pertaining to the reform of the law of contracts, the general regime 
of obligations and proof of obligations”.1 Common lawyers might be forgiven for not having paid 
close attention: it is not clear that their French colleagues have. Not only is contract law the one 
part of the Reform which the legal community really has been interested in; unjustified enrichment 
does not even appear, from its title, to be covered by it. This reflects, sadly but fairly, on the state 
of legal scholarship in a country where not a single academic would describe his main field of 
expertise as the law of unjustified enrichment (or the law of quasi-contracts, of which enrichment 
is typically regarded as a component part). Existing literature on the question, even concerning the 
pre-2016 law, is limited and generally unambitious. Historical or comparative efforts to 
contextualise it are virtually non-existent, making the newcomer’s task especially difficult. 
 The Reform was primarily meant as a restatement of the law for purposes of intelligibility 
and accessibility by domestic and foreign lawyers alike.2 Indeed it is probably because of the judge-
made nature of so much of the existing law, including of course the general action for enrichissement 
sans cause, that enrichment – and generally quasi-contract – was brought within the fold of the 
project. Yet the Ordonnance did not shy away from changes when thought necessary, the most 
noticeable (albeit not significant in itself) being the rebranding of the general enrichment claim, 
from enrichissement sans cause (“enrichment without legal ground” or “basis”) to enrichissement injustifié 
(“unjustified enrichment”). Whether it innovates or retains the existing law, the most recent 
iteration of French law is at any rate the latest link in an uninterrupted tradition harking back to 
Roman law and can only be understood against this background. This is what this paper 
endeavours to do: expound but also contextualise, historically and comparatively, the “new” 
French law of unjustified enrichment. It is a first and provisional effort in a field facing a dearth 
of analytical scholarship; if it spurs other scholars, in France and elsewhere, to take the analysis 
further, it will have achieved its aim. 
                                                 
* Reader in European Private Law, University of Edinburgh. This article was written while on a Herbert Smith Freehills 
visitorship at the University of Cambridge in Lent Term 2017; I am grateful to David Fox and other members of the 
Faculty of Law for their warm hospitality. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the many people who have helped me 
hone my views on unjustified enrichment, both in preparing this paper and over the years, in particular Birke Häcker, 
David Ibbetson, Charles Mitchell, Helen Scott and Lionel Smith. 
1 Ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve 
des obligations, Journal Officiel de la République Française, 11 February 2016, No. 26. An English translation by John 
Cartwright, Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson and Simon Whittaker (which this paper relies on) is available on the French 
Ministry of Justice’s website. 
2 The genesis of the Reform would deserve separate treatment, as would its relationship with Quebec law, which also 
codified judge-made developments (themselves inspired by French law) in 1994. The two academic projects on which 
the eventual text drew most heavily were, first, that led by Pierre Catala, with Gérard Cornu responsible for the 
sections on quasi-contracts (P Catala, Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription (La documentation 
française, Paris, 2006), 75); second, the Terré project where Philippe Remy, possibly the best French scholar on those 
issues, was responsible for the section on “other sources of obligations”: F Terré (ed), Pour une réforme du régime général 
des obligations (Dalloz, Paris, 2013), 31. 
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 The paper is divided in five parts: after some preliminary remarks to set the scene for the 
enquiry, it will examine the conditions of liability concerning the twin doctrines of recovery of 
undue payment and unjustified enrichment stricto sensu, before mapping French law onto the 
Wilburg/von Caemmerer taxonomy (which has long played a structuring role in comparative 
scholarship) and, finally, turning its attention to the measure of recovery in unjustified enrichment 
claims.  
 
B. THREE PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
 
1. Scope of the doctrine(s) 
 
A paper on “the French law of unjustified enrichment” naturally calls for a definition of its subject 
matter: what does this phrase refer to? The answer, however, turns out to be more complicated 
than one might have expected in a codified system. 
 There exists, in French law, a well-identified body of law which was known until 2016 as 
“enrichment without ground” and is to be known, after the Reform, as “unjustified enrichment”. 
It is naturally tempting to rely on terminological similarities and identify it as the mos gallicus of what 
is known internationally as the law of unjust or unjustified enrichment; yet this would be highly 
inadequate. It is not simply that individual bodies of rules which recognisably occupy the same 
place on the “map” of the law have different boundaries in different legal systems: this would 
simply be an inevitable complication to be mindful of. The problem is more fundamental and lies 
in the fact that what an English or German lawyer would regard as the heart of their law of 
unjust(ified) enrichment is found in France – as indeed in most of the Latin branch of the 
Romanist tradition – not within enrichissement injustifié but as part of a separate doctrine of “undue 
payment” (paiement de l’indu), which has formed part of the Civil Code since its origins and remains 
a distinct source of obligations after the Reform. 
 Contrary to what is often suggested in comparative scholarship, there has therefore long 
existed a law – even a codified law – of unjustified enrichment in France, namely, the body of rules 
pertaining to recovery – répétition in the old parlance, restitution in the new one – of at least certain 
types of benefits transferred between the parties with a view to performing an obligation that did 
not in fact exist (a principal subset of what English law calls “enrichment by transfer” and German 
law refers to as the Leistungskondiktion). Limited though its scope might be, compared with the 
general principles that characterise English or German law today, it dealt with cases of unjustified 
enrichments long before the celebrated Boudier case of 1892 and the judge-made developments 
that followed.3 What is known as the law of enrichissement sans cause or injustifié was only ever meant 
to extend the scope of liability to areas not covered by what might be described as the “inner 
circle” of enrichment law,4 namely, indirect enrichments, undue payments of services (reintegrated 
within the recovery of undue payments as part of the Reform) and transfers not carried out solvendi 
causa. It is best thought of as a second concentric circle. It would make no sense to examine the 
outer layer in isolation from the core it surrounds. Unjustified enrichment in French law is not, 
not even primarily, the doctrine of enrichissement injustifié. 
 But, once the semantic link has been broken, it is not clear how far one should then extend 
the scope of one’s enquiry. The problem is especially acute here because unjustified enrichment as 
a doctrine or idea, is particularly open-textured. It can plausibly be regarded as underpinning vast 
swathes of the law; indeed it has been suggested that the entirety of private law was reducible to 
it. Even if this is excessive, how far should one go? There is no ready-made answer to this question; 
                                                 
3 Cass. Req., 15 June 1892, Patureau-Miran v Boudier, DP 1892.1.596; S. 1893.1.281; post Part D(1)(b). 
4 Even the word “extending” is problematic. That paiement de l’indu can be regarded as grounded in the prohibition of 
unjustified enrichment is not controversial. Yet it follows rules which are, at least in part, different which, in turn, 
suggests that the two doctrines are not founded upon exactly the same principles. As the law stands, paiement de l’indu 
could not be abolished as a mere species of a wider genus; it retains an irreducible distinctiveness. 
 3 
given the purposes of this paper, we can safely restrict ourselves to the above two doctrines 
(recovery of undue payment and unjustified enrichment narrowly so called), limited references 
being made when necessary to other doctrines of private law which are uncontroversially 
recognized as giving effect, in specific contexts, to the principle against unjustified enrichment: for 
instance the rules concerning negotiorum gestio (Arts 1301ff. CC) or various doctrines dealing with 
what English lawyers would describe as imposed enrichments, such as the théorie des impenses. 
Additionally, because the rules on undue payment now cross-reference to a new chapter on 
“restitutions” (“les restitutions”, Arts 1352 – 1352-9 CC), which deals with a variety of instances of 
“giving back”, in particular restitutions under failed contracts – but not, remarkably, the restitution 
of unjustified enrichment – these provisions must be included as well.  
  
2. Unjustified enrichment within the Civil Code 
 
Enrichissement injustifié, narrowly so called, is now to be found as one of three nominate quasi-
contracts regulated in the Code. Restitution of undue payment is another, negotiorum gestio being the 
third. The codification of the actio de in rem verso – another name under which the general 
enrichment action was and, presumably, will continue to be known – under this heading is 
unsurprising insofar as (i) this is already where its uncodified predecessor, enrichissement sans cause, 
was held by scholars to belong, and (ii) the quasi-contractual category had increasingly come to be 
accepted as the reverse side of unjustified enrichment, broadly construed as a third pillar of 
obligations besides contract and non-contractual liability. It is nonetheless unsatisfactory 
considering the intrinsic corruption of the concept of quasi-contract, all the more so given that 
enrichissement injustifié is not quasi an identifiable contract in the same way negotiorum gestio can be 
regarded as quasi a mandate or undue payment quasi a loan: a transaction giving rise to the same 
obligations as if it had been consented to despite not having been.  
 
3. From “enrichment without ground” to “unjustified enrichment” 
 
The most noticeable change brought about by the Reform might be the relabelling of the category 
formerly known as “enrichment without ground” (or “cause”), henceforth to be known as 
“unjustified enrichment”; yet it is perhaps the least significant. No substantive change was intended 
to follow and none is likely to ensue. The concern was simply to remove the concept of cause 
altogether from the Code after it had been – controversially – discarded in the context of contract 
law,5 even though it had long been clear that cause did not mean the same thing in the context of 
enrichment (where it designates the legal ground on which the enrichment can be retained) and 
contract (where it refers to the reason for the debtor’s obligation: cur debetur?).  
 
C. ENRICHMENT SOLVENDI CAUSA: RESTITUTION OF UNDUE PAYMENT 
 




The inner circle of the French law of unjustified enrichment concerns the recovery (répétition, 
restitution) of “undue payments”, dealt with in Arts 1302 to 1302-3 of the Civil Code. Immediately 
we are confronted with a terminological difficulty. In this context paiement is used to refer to the 
performance (execution, fulfilment, discharge, satisfaction) of any obligation, whether monetary 
                                                 
5 Rapport au Président de la République relatif à l’ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du 
droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations, Journal Officiel de la République Française, 11 February 
2016, No. 25. 
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or not.6 Yet only an existing obligation can be paid: if the (would-be) payment was undue, by 
construction there was no bond to discharge. Accordingly, common though the phrase might be, 
“payment of the undue” is a contradiction in terms. Whatever the provision of the benefit amounts 
to in legal terms, it is not a paiement.7 French writers are content to accept this but hardly ever ask 
the next question, namely: if the action for recovery of undue payments is not about the recovery 
of undue “payments”, then what is it about?  
 The key to the answer is that the only difference between the (false) payment of an indebitum 
and the (real) payment of the corresponding debitum is that the object of the performance was not 
owed to the other party by the claimant. But the act is the same – the transfer of a benefit to the 
defendant; and so is its purpose – the untying of a bond through performance of the obligation. 
Accordingly, what characterises the payment of the undue is that it was done solvendi causa – “for 
the purpose of solving” – but failed to achieve its purpose because there was nothing to “dissolve”. 
This is what the doctrine of “recovery of undue payments”, properly understood, deals with. Even 
though the misleading label is in danger of concealing it, a conferral of a benefit to the defendant 
that was not done with that particular purpose in mind is not – or at least should not be – a paiement 
for the purposes of Arts 1302ff. CC. 
 
(b) Undue payment and the Roman condictiones 
 
Save for a brief allusion, the above was set out without reference to history; yet, as even this brief 
allusion to the condictio indebiti and Pothier hinted, it is difficult to understand the modern state of 
French unjustified enrichment law without understanding how it came into existence, which in 
turn entails returning to the Roman system of condictiones – personal actions that were designed to 
reverse transfers of ownership in situations where the defendant, even though he had acquired 
title,8 was regarded as having a duty to restore the thing received to the claimant because its 
retention would be “without basis” (retinere sine causa).9 
 Chief among them was the condictio indebiti, which was available when a sum of money, or 
other thing (res), had been transferred in order to discharge an obligation that did not in fact exist. 
That French paiement de l’indu is heir to the Roman condictio indebiti can hardly be doubted; if proof 
was needed, it is the only way to explain why, until the Reform, the paiement contemplated had to 
be (like under the classical condictio indebiti, but contrary to the normal scope of paiement) either certa 
res or certa pecunia: a determined thing or sum of money – including an ascertained quantity of a 
fungible thing (certa quantitas) but excluding the performance of a service. It is only in 2016 that 
the historical link was severed and the action for undue payment became available, as logic would 
dictate, for the restitution of the value of a service performed without being owed.  
 What complicates things, however, is that – quite apart from this recent extension – the 
French action has always been broader than its Roman ancestor. In particular, at least that section 
of the condictio furtiva which relied on performance on the claimant’s part (which the defendant 
would have known to be undue to him, hence his being held as a thief)10 was subsumed under 
répétition de l’indu. While, contrary to Roman law, bad-faith receipt does not prevent title from 
passing in French law, and does not make the recipient a thief, this conflation of actions has had 
                                                 
6 However, for historical reasons due to the ghost image of the condictio indebiti as it existed in classical Roman law and 
was made his own by Pothier, the doctrine of undue payment traditionally excluded the provision of services. A 
principal change brought about by the 2016 reform was (following a proposal made by Philippe Remy in the Terré 
project) to bring it within its scope. 
7 This is the reason why the term reçu (received) was substituted for payé (paid) in Art 1302 CC. On its face this would 
seem to broaden the scope of the doctrine to all transfers, regardless of their purpose. But it is clear that this was not 
intended; indeed the traditional name – hence scope – of the doctrine was retained in the relevant heading. 
8 The condictio furtiva was an exception but it is universally regarded as abnormal (and already was by Gaius); we should 
not take it into account when considering “condictions” as a whole. 
9 For an overview, see R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996), 854ff. 
10 Ibid, 849. 
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one notable consequence: that of giving rise to two different measures of recovery – one for good-
faith recipients, heir to the condictio indebiti and more protective of the defendant; the other for bad-
faith recipients, heir to the condictio furtiva and, unsurprisingly, much less protective.11 In that sense, 
French paiement de l’indu really rolls up the two actions into one.  
 What about the other condictiones? The action that came to be known as the condictio ob 
causam finitam, which concerned transfers that were owed at the time but later became undue with 
retroactive effect (for instance the payment of money damages pursuant to a judgement that was 
subsequently reformed), would also straightforwardly come under the modern doctrine of paiement 
de l’indu: it makes no difference whether the obligation did or did not exist in the first place, as long 
as performance has become undue by the time the claim is brought.12 The condictio causa data causa 
non secuta, concerning transfers made for a purpose which failed to materialise, would be dealt with 
as part of the general enrichment action. The condictio ob iniustam causam (dealing with the return of 
donations between husband and wife, which were void in Roman law) has no application in French 
law; and the condictio ob turpem causam (concerning agreements with an immoral purpose) would be 
dealt with as part of the law of contracts.13 
 
(c) “Condicting” and vindicating benefits 
 
It is therefore not true that, as is regularly claimed, French law did away with the Roman condictiones 
– which in turn is supposed to explain why, contrary to German law (which built its law of 
unjustified enrichment on a generalized Kondiktionensystem), it had to resort to an altogether 
different legal basis, the actio de in rem verso, to that effect. What is true, however, is that rules 
pertaining to the transfer of ownership that came to prevail in modern French law have extended 
– albeit to an extent which is far from clear – the scope of property law at the expense of the law 
of obligations, including the law of unjustified enrichment.14  
 As is well known, modern French law considers that contracts said to be “translative of 
property” (contrats translatifs de propriété, of which sale is the paradigmatic example) operate the 
transfer of ownership by the sole agreement of the parties (solo consensu).15 To put the same point 
differently, the obligation to transfer ownership of the thing is executed instantly and by operation 
of the law the moment the contract is complete, without the need for any further action, in 
particular delivery (traditio), on the part of the parties.16 One principal consequence is that the 
retroactive avoidance of the contract, whether through nullity (nullité), termination (rescision) or 
lapse (caducité, a new doctrine introduced by the Ordonnance), immediately transfers ownership 
back to the transferor. Title being regarded as having never passed the claimant can, at least prima 
facie, bring the rei vindicatio to claim the thing back. This is a major difference between French law 
on the one hand and Roman or German law on the other.  
 However it is important not to overstate this doctrine of transfer of ownership solo consensu. 
We know it applies to a specific type of transactions and in respect of benefits which are capable 
of being vindicated, i.e. immovables (immeubles) and ascertained movable property (corps certains), 
                                                 
11 See post Part F(2)(b). 
12 However restitutions after avoidance of contract have always been regarded as a law unto themselves, not – or at 
least not necessarily – grounded in the recovery of undue payments: see post n 40. 
13 Here the contract would be void for immoral cause – now lack of “lawful content”: Art. 1128 CC – and the law may 
or may not permit recovery of benefits transferred based on underlying policy reasons. 
14 Consonant with the rest of the civilian tradition, unjustified enrichment is regarded as a source of obligations only 
in French law: no property right can arise from the receipt of a reversible enrichment. On the other hand, the primacy 
of restitution in kind (post Part F(1)(b)) means that the obligation imposed on the defendant will often be to re-transfer 
ownership of a specific asset. 
15 Art. 1196 (formerly 1138) CC; see also Art. 938 CC for gifts (donation) and Art. 1583 CC for sale. 
16 This development is frequently attributed to Domat but this is mistaken. His Loix civiles, §1.1.2.2.10, clearly adhere 
to the traditional view that, in the contract of sale, ownership is transferred upon delivery (traditio). That view was also 
firmly held by Pothier. Rather it seems that the source is to be found in d’Aguesseau’s 15th plaidoyer (1692). 
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but – ordinarily – not money and unascertained movable property (choses de genre), in respect of 
which ownership would have passed upon mixing. Outside of these scenarios, the situation is 
much less clear. In particular, in the case of undue payments which do not arise from the 
retroactive avoidance of a contrat translatif de propriété, there is often uncertainty surrounding the 
question whether ownership has passed in the first place, hence whether the thing should be 
vindicated rather than “condicted”. 
 To take an example which would clearly fall under the claim for restitution of undue 
payment, A transfers a res certa to B in the mistaken belief that he owed it to him. Has B acquired 
ownership? Remarkably the position is not settled in French law. Pothier’s view was that it had: 
“He who pays by mistake something which he believes he owes to another intends to transfer 
dominion by delivering it; similarly he who is paid intends to become owner: such agreement of 
their wills suffices, along with delivery, to convey ownership”.17 One would look in vain for such 
an explicit principle in post-1804 French law, whether in the Code, case law or treatises on the law 
of property: delivery solvendi causa is not one of the recognised modes of acquisition of ownership 
when no obligation to give actually exists. Yet the transfer seems to be implicit in the fact that the 
action for paiement de l’indu is a personal, not real, action, which only makes sense if ownership has 
in fact passed. This view is endorsed, if only tacitly, by most scholars. 
 There is however another view, which was put forward by Toullier: given that the claimant 
is mistaken, there was no valid consent to give and receive underpinning the delivery, hence no 
passing of ownership.18 Having remained owner the claimant can (and, presumably, should) 
vindicate it. This view still has supporters today;19 but, while it would seem to be the better one on 
first principles, it is difficult to understand why a thing capable of being vindicated could be 
claimed under the codal provisions pertaining to undue payment, which as was said assume that 
ownership has passed.20 Yet this is something that courts have clearly always allowed. This 
discrepancy, unnoticed by scholars, is troubling.  
 It might be that the answer is that it would be a false dichotomy to assume that either 
ownership has passed and the action to be brought must be a condictio, or it has not and it should 
be a rei vindicatio. It is not logically impossible for a legal system to allow an owner to bring a condictio: 
in such a case, we would need to accept that, at some point in the legal process, he implicitly 
relinquishes ownership – which at that point is acquired by the other party, if only through occupatio 
of what would now be a res nullius – turning his claim into one for the re-transfer of ownership. As 
Lionel Smith has observed, this was the case with the condictio furtiva and is also the (mostly implicit) 
principle underpinning the English tort of conversion.21 It would make sense of the above 
discrepancy if we accepted that the same principle is at work in modern French law – but, if it is, 
legal scholars have been remarkably silent about it.22 
                                                 
17 RJ Pothier, “Du quasi-contrat appelé promutuum, et de l’action condictio indebiti”, in Œuvres complètes (new ed., Thomine 
& Fortic, Paris, 1821), vol 8, 252. 
18 CBM Toullier, Le droit civil français suivant l’ordre du Code (6th ed. by JB Duvergier, Cotillon & Renouard, Paris, 1843), 
vol 6, §58. 
19 E.g. H, L and J Mazeaud, Leçons de droit civil (9th ed. by F Chabas, Montchrestien, Paris, 1998), 799 (who puzzlingly 
argue that the claimant has a proprietary action against remote recipients but a personal action in recovery of undue 
payment against the immediate one).  
20 Naturally there are other principles on which ownership could have passed, but it is not apparent which one(s) 
would account for the transfer in such a case. In particular, it must be remembered that the doctrine according to 
which “in the case of movable property, possession is equivalent to title” (Art. 2276 [formerly 2279] CC) does not 
apply to the relationship between transferor and transferee. 
21 L Smith, “Property, Subsidiarity and Unjust Enrichment”, in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified 
Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (CUP, Cambridge, 2002), 588, 589-92. 
22 A related difficulty (and possible explanation) is that much terminological uncertainty shrouds the issue. In 
particular, scholars and courts tend to focus not on the nature, in personam or in rem, of the action but on its content, 
and speak of an obligation de restitution, i.e. a “duty to restore”. This word, restitution, is as ambiguous in French as in 
English; it can equally refer to the physical surrendering of a thing that never left the claimant’s estate or the re-transfer 
of ownership to its previous owner. Accordingly they have no difficulty describing the rei vindicatio as an action en 
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2. Conditions of liability: mistake, duress and fault 
 
To summarize: the misnamed doctrine of undue payments concerns transfers – including, since 
2016, the provision of services – done solvendi causa in situations where the obligation turned out 
not to exist, preventing the intended payment to become an actual payment. It does not matter 
why the duty did not exist: for instance it might have been carried out in furtherance of a contract 
which never came into existence or turned out to be invalid, or the obligation might have been a 
different one or have existed between different parties. In all cases the transfer is, as between the 
parties,23 lacking a legal ground, i.e. a cause for the retention of the benefit.24 This section explores 
the conditions of liability under the claim. 
 
(a) Mistake (and duress) 
 
Must the payment also have been mistaken, i.e. is it necessary that the claimant should have 
believed he was bound to pay the defendant? This question, which has long vexed Romanists, has 
also caused much ink to spill in modern French law. 
 To understand the question we must first distinguish between three types of indebita. When 
A transfers x to B in order to discharge his obligation to him, and x was not in fact owed by the 
former to the latter, there are three logical possibilities:  
 
(1) A was not the debtor of the obligation to pay x and neither was B its creditor. French law calls this 
an absolute (or objective) indebitum (indu absolu, indu objectif); 
(2) A owed x but to C1 not B: this is the first case of relative (or subjective) indebitum (indu relatif, indu 
subjectif); 
(3) B was owed x but by C2 not A: this is the reverse case of “relative indebitum” and corresponds to 
the payment of another’s debt.  
 
In all three cases French law gives an action to A against B for restitution of undue payment.25 
The Code of 1804 only mentioned error in the context of the third scenario; it was silent 
concerning the first two. However, consonant with the dominant understanding of classical 
Roman law, of the condictio indebiti being, as Donellus and Pothier put it, a condictio indebiti per errorem 
soluti (“an action of debt relating to something undue paid by mistake”),26 courts and scholars 
swiftly filled the silence of the Code and extended the requirement of error to all cases of solutum 
indebitum. It was never clear, however, if mistake – which encompassed mistakes of law as well as 
of fact – had to be proved by the claimant or could be presumed from the absence of the debt; 
                                                 
restitution, just like the paiement de l’indu is an action in restitution: see e.g. C Guelfucci-Thibierge, Nullité, restitutions et 
responsabilité (LGDJ, Paris, 1992), 371, 401-2. This makes it exceedingly difficult to ascertain the nature, real or personal, 
of the claimant’s action. 
23 It is irrelevant that the defendant’s enrichment might be justified for the purposes of the law of unjustified 
enrichment. For instance, where the claimant paid the defendant in the mistaken belief that a third party’s debt was 
his own, he can recover under undue payment even though (quite apart from issues of subsidiarity) a claim in 
unjustified enrichment would fail on the basis that the enrichment was justified by the third party’s debt. What matters 
in undue payment is that the debt he intended to dissolve, i.e. his own, did not exist. 
24 It is true that the disputed transfer might have been carried out by the claimant for a purpose which provides a legal 
basis for its retention, for instance with liberal intent (animus donandi) or in order to settle a dispute between the parties. 
But, in such cases, by construction the transfer would not have been done solvendi causa. It might be a (justified) 
enrichment by transfer but it not a “due payment”. Here we see the dangers of using a label which conceals the nature 
of the claim. 
25 In scenario (3), besides an action against B, the Code now also gives one against the real debtor, C2: Art. 1302-2 al. 
2 CC. (This was not part of the Code of 1804 and was recognised para legem by the Cour de Cassation in 2001.) This 
cannot possibly be a case of undue payment, since there was no payment from A to C2, and has to be based on 
unjustified enrichment.  
26 For a summary of the debates concerning the requirement of error in the condictio indebiti, see Zimmermann (supra n 
9), 849ff. It seems that error (or rather the lack thereof) would have gone to defences rather than the prima facie cause 
of action. 
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courts, especially after 1965, tended to move from the former to the latter. In 1993, however, the 
Court of Cassation changed its stance and removed the requirement of mistake in scenarios (1) 
and (2), retaining it only (as it was bound to by the clear codal provision) in the last one. It remained 
however open to the defendant to prove lack of error (i.e. that the claimant knew he was not 
obliged to pay) or – which is very largely the reverse side of the same idea – that the transfer really 
had a legal basis, such as a gratuitous intention.27 
 What failed to be observed in this debate, however, is that in all but one – perhaps 
abnormal – case, error is in fact consubstantial to claims for undue payment, if one that that can 
be presumed from the nature of the claim. The reason is that what the doctrine visits is, by 
definition, transfers carried out solvendi causa. If the transfer was effected in order to dissolve an 
obligation but the obligation did not exist at all (scenario (1)), the claimant must have been mistaken 
about its existence.28 There is no other possibility; situations where the claimant intended the 
transfer as a liberality, or paid to avoid troubles, or under duress (not believing he was bound),29 
are not payments to start with: they are not transfers solvendi causa and do not come within the 
scope of the doctrine in the first place.  
The same reasoning applies to scenario (2), where the claimant will also have been mistaken 
about the identity of the creditor.  
 Scenario (3) is indeed different. It captures two different situations, of which there is reason 
to believe that only one is properly an undue payment. De deux choses l’une: either A paid believing 
that C’s debt was his own, or he knowingly paid C’s debt. In the first case, he was by construction 
mistaken and we are back to the above scenarios. In the second one, he meant to pay another’s 
debt, which, in French law, is in principle a perfectly valid juridical act. It seems that there are three 
reasons why this might have occurred:  
 
(i) A meant to claim reimbursement from C later, in which case he will be regarded as the manager 
of the latter’s affairs and will have a claim under the actio negotiorum gestorum contraria; but no claim 
in undue payment because there was no mistake about the existence of the claim. 
(ii) A intended to gratify C, in which case again there will not be no action in undue payment 
because of the absence of mistake; given that the transfer has a cause (it was carried out donandi 
causa), it cannot be recovered in unjustified enrichment either. 
(iii) A was coerced into paying, for instance because he stood in a close relationship to the actual 
debtor: in that case, the Code now explicitly recognises – as courts long had – that he will be able 
to recover (in undue payment) despite the existence of the debt being paid and his absence of 
error.30 
 
Only the first alternative can properly be described as an undue payment. The transfer was carried 
out to pay one’s debt, which debt did not exist: the payment was therefore undue, and for the same 
reason it was mistaken. In all three branches of the second alternative, it was done in order to 
dissolve a debt which did in fact exist;31 it is therefore not undue and, by the same token, it is not 
mistaken.32 Error and undue payment, correctly defined, are inextricably the flipside one of the 
other. 
                                                 
27 As mentioned above, this amounts to showing that the transfer was not a payment in the first place, not that it is a 
“due payment”. 
28 The same is true when the payment becomes retroactively undue because of the nullity of the act – contract, 
judgement, etc. – that originally gave (or appeared to give) rise to it: the claimant will have paid at the time under a 
mistaken belief in the existence of a valid obligation. 
29 On the other hand, paying under duress one’s own debt to the rightful creditor is a proper payment since the 
contemplated obligation did in fact exist.   
30 Art. 1302-2 al. 1 CC. In order to protect the defendant, the claim disappears when, relying on the receipt, he 
cancelled his instrument of title or released a security. 
31 The relevant question is not whether the debt paid was owed by the claimant or another party but whether the bond 
that did in fact exist was the same as the one which the claimant intended to discharge. 
32 The argument is not that there should be no recovery, but that there should be no claim in undue payment. In scenario 
(i) the claimant – rightly – has an action for negotiorum gestio (excluding, through subsidiarity, any alternative claim in 




A question that has long plagued French law is the extent, if any, to which the claimant’s fault is 
relevant to either the availability of the action or the scope of recovery. French law departs very 
significantly from either English or German law on this question, which deserves examination. 
 The post-Ordonnance position is that, in respect of both undue payment and unjustified 
enrichment, fault is a factor that goes to quantum of recovery. The court may reduce the 
“restitution” (Art 1302-3 CC) or “indemnification” (Art 1303-2 CC) of the claimant based on – 
i.e., presumably, in proportion of – his “fault”. Prior to the Reform there was no statutory 
provision and case-law had been haphazard, meandering between barring the fautif claimant’s 
action altogether, to disregarding it, to distinguishing on the basis of the degree of fault or the type 
of indebitum.33 The latest iteration had been that fault was no bar in itself, but any loss caused to 
the defendant by the claimant’s fault could be offset against the quantum of recovery. 
 Fault has never been defined in either context. As far as undue payments are concerned it 
seems to only ever mean one thing: having paid negligently, in the sense of not having taken due 
care to check the existence of the debt before paying the accipiens. It is not difficult to understand 
how a payment can be negligent in that sense but it is much less straightforward to understand 
what consequences this should have and why. It has always been the case that if the claimant’s 
negligence had caused the defendant loss, that loss could be offset by the defendant. This is a 
simple case of rolling up two actions in one: one party’s claim in undue payment and the other’s 
(counter-)claim in civil liability. Yet what would “loss” mean in that context? Apart from the 
disappointment of finding out that one is not as rich as one had thought, it is not clear how the 
duty to return a benefit that one is by definition not entitled to retain could constitute a loss. Yet 
this is exactly what courts came, at least in some cases, to accept (without looking into events that 
occurred post-receipt).34 This is rather perplexing. 
 In reality, the role of the claimant’s fault is transparently to protect the security of the 
defendant’s receipt in situations where it is thought that it would cause the defendant undue 
hardship to be obliged to return it. A prime example, around which much case-law has historically 
revolved, is social security payments made to individuals on low incomes who are later notified 
that they must return benefits to which, it turns out, they were not entitled. Here, courts have 
regularly construed the duty to return the benefit as “loss” for the purposes of Art. 1382 (now 
1240) CC and, to further protect defendants, they also often presumed the faute from the very 
payment of the indebitum.35 
 The real issue here, which the rule is a poor attempt at mitigating, is that, when it comes 
to undue payments of money,36 French law does not have a defence of good-faith change of 
position.37 Under the restitutionary paradigm, what must be returned is prima facie what was 
received, i.e. in English terms the “enrichment received”. There is no equivalent to the rule 
applying to immovables or ascertained movable property, that what must be returned by good-
faith defendants is, in kind or value, whatever remains of the thing received. To put the same point 
                                                 
a case of unjustified enrichment, where the existence of a legal ground to the defendant’s enrichment, C’s debt to B, 
is defeated by the “unjust factor” of duress. 
33 For details, see O Deshayes, T Genicon and YM Laithier, Réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des 
obligations (LexisNexis, Paris, 2016), 549; AM Romani, “La faute de l’appauvri dans l’enrichissement sans cause et dans 
la répétition de l’indu”, D. 1983. Chr. 23; Guelfucci-Thibierge (supra n 22), 432ff. Because fault was seen by at least 
one strand of cases as going to the very availability of restitution, it is better treated in this section than under quantum 
of recovery.  
34 For details, see R Thunhart, “Le paiement de l’indu en droit comparé français, allemand, autrichien et suisse”, 53 
Revue internationale de droit comparé (2001) 183, 187ff. 
35 Ibid, 189. 
36 Or other fungibles – but in practice the bulk of cases concern monetary payments. 
37 For difficulties concerning the restitution of the value of services (now also coming under the provisions for 
recovery of undue payment when carried out solvendi causa), see post Part D(2)(c). 
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differently, it is irrebuttably presumed that when things become mixed into a fund, the enrichment 
persists at the time of litispendence. While it is not difficult to sympathise with the aim of the rule, 
it is clearly wrong. Not only is there no particular reason why the scope of recovery should depend 
on the claimant’s state of mind, there is no logical connection (or even correlation) between how 
negligent the claimant was and how “disenriched” the defendant worthy of protection.  
 Prior to 2016 the law looked, at least in principle, to the consequences of the claimant’s fault. 
Consonant with the logic of civil liability, what had to be taken into account was the loss caused 
to the defendant. The emphasis was shifted by the Reform to the negligence itself. This moves the 
rule away from the set-off model to one that is perhaps best described as what English lawyers 
would call a “balance of equities” between the parties: a remedy arguably worse than any affliction 
the previous state of affairs might have suffered from. Difficult though it might be to work out in 
practice, what is needed is the recognition of what the law has been groping for here through the 
doctrine of claimant’s fault, namely, a defence of disenrichment for good-faith recipients of, in 
particular, money – the equivalent of that which avails in the case of other benefits unduly “paid” 
(or indeed under the general action for unjustified enrichment).38 
 




(a) Generalities about the actio de in rem verso 
 
We move from the inner to the outer circle of French enrichment law. Art 1303 CC, which put 
on a statutory footing the judge-made action traditionally referred to as the actio de in rem verso (even 
though it has little to do with the namesake Roman action), provides that:  
 
Apart from the situation of management of another’s affairs and undue payment, a person who 
benefits from an unjustified enrichment to the detriment of another person must indemnify the 
person who is thereby made the poorer to an amount equal to the lesser of the two values of the 
enrichment and the impoverishment. 
 
This can be described as the general action for unjustified enrichment in modern French law. As 
mentioned, a great paradox of French law is that the general action does not cover the core cases 
of enrichment liability, which are dealt with through a different doctrine answering to a logic 
which, albeit similar, is not identical. This exclusion is made explicit by the introductory clause of 
Art. 1303 CC, although the doctrine of subsidiarity39 makes it redundant. Accordingly, even though 
such situations are prima facie covered by the words of the provision, the general action does not 
deal with transfers done solvendi causa (including, since 2016, the performance of undue services); 
on the other hand, even though it might be excluded in particular contexts by other doctrines, it 
does apply at least prima facie to indirect enrichments and to transfers carried out for other 
purposes than the “dissolving” of an obligation.40 
                                                 
38 Post Part F(3)(a). In German law the defence of disenrichment would apply because it is built into the 
Leistungskondiktion (itself conceived of as an enrichment action) through which such claims would be brought: §818 
(3) BGB.  
39 On which see post Part D(2)(b). 
40 It is worth spelling out how narrow the scope of application of the general action has become. Besides its being 
ousted by all manner of other doctrines through the principle of subsidiarity, including its core area of –  prima facie 
– application, four facts combine to explain this. First, property law is broader in French law than in many other legal 
systems (ante Part C(1)(c)). Second, there exists virtually no restitution for wrongs (post Part E(3)). Third, French law 
is in principle happy to justify the retention of a benefit by the defendant on the basis of a juridical act with a third 
party (post Part D(2)(b)), to the effect that the seminal Boudier case would no longer succeed today. Fourth, restitutions 
after avoidance of contract are regarded as forming a law unto themselves, at least for presentational purposes (they 
will be dealt with as part of the law of contracts rather than quasi-contracts) and, for most scholars at least, 
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 The core requirements of the action are straightforward: the claimant must establish the 
existence of an enrichment on the part of the defendant that correlates with an impoverishment 
on his own part and is not condoned by the legal order, in the sense that it must lack a legal basis 
(a “justification”, formerly called a “cause”, i.e. a reason for the retention of the benefit). 
Furthermore, even though French law would not use this terminology, the law recognises three 
“defences” to liability, two full and a partial one:  
 
(i) the fact that the claimant acted for his own benefit; 
(ii) good-faith change of position (hidden within the provision on measure of recovery);41 
(iii) claimant’s fault – an open-textured concept which allows courts to apportion liability in a way 
that they consider, in English parlance, “fair and equitable”. 
 
Finally, the “subsidiary” character of the claim means that the scope of liability in unjustified 




Little needs to be said in the present context about the history of the doctrine, on which abundant 
literature already exists.42 By way of the briefest summary, the Roman action known as actio de in 
rem verso (lit. “the action concerning [what was] turned into the thing” [read, the patrimony of the 
defendant]), which originally concerned a narrow and specific case of indirect enrichment,43 was 
pressed into service as the vehicle through which Pomponius’ maxim that “no one should be 
enriched at the expense of another”44 could be given legal effect. For most of its Roman-French 
history, the action only existed in the law books: it was part of learned law, le droit savant. Courts, 
however, resorted to various devices to grant remedies para legem in situations of unconscionable 
enrichment not covered by specific doctrines like impenses or the condictio indebiti. In particular, the 
19th century was marked by an abnormal extension of the scope of negotiorum gestio to situations 
where the claimant had acted in his own interest rather than the defendant’s, a doctrine broad 
enough to cover potentially any case of unjustifiable enrichment outside the condictio indebiti, but 
with no normative underpinning.  
 Meanwhile Zachariae von Lingenthal, and later Charles Aubry and Charles Rau, inferred 
on the basis of various codal provisions the existence, as a matter of post-1804 positive law, of a 
general action in “enrichment without legitimate cause”.45 For most of the 19th century, litigants 
attempting to rely on the actio de in rem verso in court would fail; but ultimately the Court of Cassation 
gave in and, in the celebrated Boudier case, recognised the existence, outside of the Code, of an 
enforceable “principle of equity” which “forbids being enriched to the detriment of another”.46 
The later history of enrichissement sans cause in French law, until the 2016 codification, can be read 
as one of specifying the requirements of the action – in practice, whittling down the scope of 
                                                 
substantively as well (in the sense that they are regarded as arising from “the rules of nullity” themselves rather than 
undue payment or unjustified enrichment). 
41 Post Part F(3)(a). 
42 See e.g., in French, F Goré, L’enrichissement aux dépens d’autrui (Dalloz, Paris, 1949), 5-30; in English, JP Dawson, 
Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis (Brown & Co, Boston, 1951), 92-109. The most detailed account is in 
German: W Lang, Der allgemeine Bereicherungsanspruch im französischen Recht vor und nach dem Code Civil (PhD dissertation, 
Frankfurt, 1975).  
43 Zimmermann (supra n 9), 878ff. 
44 D.50.17.206: “Iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem” (“By the law of nature, it 
is fair that no-one be enriched by the detriment and injury of another”). 
45 C Aubry and C Rau, Cours de droit civil français, vol. 6 (4th ed, Marchal & Billard, Paris, 1873), §578: “The action de in 
rem verso, of which the Civil Code only contains specific applications, must be allowed in a general manner, as the 
sanction of the rule of equity according to which it is not permissible to be enriched at the expense of another, 
whenever, the patrimony of a person being enriched without a legitimate cause to the detriment of that of another, 
the latter would not have at his disposal, in order to obtain what belongs to him or is owed to him, an action arising 
from a contract, a quasi-contract, a delict or a quasi-delict”. 
46 Boudier (supra n 3): “deriving from the principle of equity that forbids being enriched at another’s expense”. 
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application of what was quickly recognised as an enormously disruptive, in its potential, new 
doctrine of private law.  
 
(c) Relationship between the general action and undue payment 
 
i) subsidiarity 
By application of the principle of subsidiarity, which will be returned to below, whenever the facts 
relied upon by the claimant are sufficient to give rise to a claim in undue payment, the enriched 
party will not be allowed to by-pass this action and sue in unjustified enrichment instead:47 paiement 
de l’indu always takes precedence, within its sphere of application, over enrichissement injustifié 
narrowly so called. However, it should be noted that French law does not follow German law in 
its strong exclusionary rule whereby, if A made a Leistung – of which undue “payment” would be 
a species – towards B, those facts normally suffice to exclude all other actions (from A against a 
third party, by a third party against B or between two third parties) on the basis of the same shift 
of wealth. In particular – and this is in fact one of its most striking features from a comparative 
perspective – French law is happy in principle with the idea that if the claimant has performed 
(e.g. under a contract) towards his counterparty, he might sue in unjustified enrichment a third 
party who has benefited from the performance even though he was not the recipient of it.48  
 
ii) subsumption?  
Behind this description of the law lies another question, which is whether there is any principled 
reason why there should be two actions dealing – if through slightly different rules – with the same 
issue of the reversal of a benefit that ought not to be retained. Why have one doctrine for one type 
of enrichments and another for the rest? This is all the more puzzling because the line drawn 
between the two does not appear to have any normative force. It is hard to resist the conclusion 
that it is a historical happenstance: because a (narrower) set of rules already existed – which itself 
owed much to the idiosyncrasies of Roman law – the general principle was made to work around 
it once it came into existence, instead of swallowing it as it logically should have.49 It is true that 
the two sets of rules operate in ways which are not identical, and at times exhibit significant 
discrepancies: but this too seems to be a historical accident, brought about by the existence of two 
different “pegs” which were allowed to develop their own separate rationalities. 
 
2. Conditions of liability 
 
(a) Enrichment and correlative impoverishment 
 
French law, both pre- and post-Reform, insists on an enrichment on the defendant’s part and a 
correlative impoverishment on the claimant’s.50 This twin requirement can be disposed of quickly. 
French law subscribes to a very broad understanding of what counts as enrichment, encompassing 
any “benefit” (avantage) that can be valued in money, including the acquisition of a new right – real 
or personal – or an increase in the content of an existing right, expenses saved or a debt paid. In 
the same way it is accepted that impoverishment can take the most varied forms, provided again a 
monetary value can be put on them.51 Besides, enrichment and impoverishment must be 
                                                 
47 Given the rules of both liability and recovery applicable to both actions, it does not seem that there would ever be 
a situation where the latter would be more advantageous to the claimant anyway.  
48 Post Part D(2)(b). 
49 This is not to say that undue payment could not be retained as an identified subset of claims within the broader 
principle, along lines similar to the Leistungskondiktion in German law. 
50 Until the Reform, the accepted solution was that both impoverishment and enrichment should exist (and were to 
be valued) at the time when the action was brought. This point is returned to, along with the new position, in Part F. 
51 AM Romani, “Enrichissement sans cause”, in Répertoire de droit civil, Encyclopédie Dalloz (2016), §§48-9, 88.  
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“correlated”: this is the French version of what it means for the defendant’s enrichment to have 
been “at the expense of” the claimant. In cases of direct enrichment the link will typically be 
straightforward, but much less so when the enrichment is indirect. Unsurprisingly perhaps, courts 
or scholars have not developed any mature theory about what constitutes a sufficient nexus. The 
action will be rejected if too much time elapsed, or too many intermediaries were involved, 
between the two events represented by the impoverishment and the enrichment.52 
 As is well-known, the requirement of impoverishment is not one that is shared by all legal 
systems; in particular neither English nor German law has it (although lingering doubts can be 
seen to surface, at intervals, in the former).53 From a French perspective it is however regarded as 
entirely unproblematic and, despite the lessons of comparative law, no scholar appears to have 
doubted that it was self-evident. The one argument typically pressed into service is that, if he 
recovered more than his impoverishment, the claimant would end up being himself unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the defendant. The implications of this stance, in particular as to 
whether the law of unjustified enrichment really is a law of benefits that ought to be given up, as 
opposed to a law of unjust impoverishment in the absence of a wrong (or to use the terminology 
of Boudier, echoed in the common-law world by Stoljar, a law of unjust “sacrifice”), is not one that 
has received any attention.54 
 
(b) Lack of legal ground and “absence of any other action” 
 
Remarkably, the above condition is all that the Cour de cassation insisted on in its seminal 1892 
decision: “it suffices [for the action de in rem verso to be allowed] that the claimant should allege, 
and offer to establish the existence of, a benefit which, by his own sacrifice or act, he conferred 
on the person against whom he is claiming”.55 That this is unconscionably broad should be obvious 
from a comparative perspective; unsurprisingly, French courts came up in the decades that 
followed with two main control devices (which already featured in Aubry and Rau’s formulation)56 
to restrict the scope of the action. One, the “absence of cause” (absence de cause), will not be 
surprising to comparative lawyers: it is an instantiation of the general sine causa approach of the 
civilian tradition to the unjustifiability of the enrichment. The other, now referred to as 
“subsidiarity” (subsidiarité), is less straightforward, as can be seen from the fact that other legal 
systems appear to dispense with it altogether.  
 It helps to study these requirements together because, even though they are analytically 
separate, they were developed at the same time and to achieve the same purpose, namely, keep in 
check the massive potential for disruption inherent in the doctrine the Court of Cassation had 
carved out of “equitable principles”. There is also much overlap between the two doctrines, to the 
point where it can be doubted whether subsidiarity plays any meaningful role and should be 
retained as a separate requirement. 
 
i) “absence of cause” 
In 1914 the Court of Cassation made it clear that the enrichment had to be “without legitimate 
cause”,57 an ingredient of liability that has been retained unflaggingly ever since and will of course 
continue after the Reform, even though it will presumably now be known as the “absence of 
justification” to the enrichment. For some time there was uncertainty as to what this meant, in 
                                                 
52 Romani (supra n 51), §122 and references cited. 
53 Most recently in HMRC v ITC [2017] UKSC 29 at [43] (“The reversal of unjust enrichment, usually by a restitutionary 
remedy, is premised on the claimant’s also having suffered a loss through his provision of the benefit”, per Lord 
Reed). 
54 The point is alluded to in P Conte, “Faute de l’appauvri et cause de l’appauvrissement : réflexions hétérodoxes sur 
un aspect controversé de la théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause”, 86 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (1987), 223, 226. 
55 Boudier (supra n 3). 
56 Post n 45. They only appeared, however, in the fourth edition. 
57 Cass. Civ., 12 May 1914, [1918-19] S. I. 41, citing verbatim Aubry and Rau’s formula (post n 45). 
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particular because the language of “cause” had already been pressed into service in the context of 
contract. It soon came to be accepted, however, that cause in enrichissement sans cause had a different 
– if in practice often overlapping – meaning from the cause-contrepartie (quid pro quo) of contract 
law, namely, the validation by the legal system of the shift of wealth: what Ripert and Tisseire 
called the “right to keep” the enrichment.58 Accordingly the shift between the patrimonies is prima 
facie reversible – the “unjustified unless” approach of the civilian tradition – but this stops being 
the case if there is a rule in the legal order which, directly or indirectly, sanctions it. In English we 
would speak of there being a legal “basis” or “ground” for the enrichment. 
 What does legal basis mean in that context or, to put the same question differently, what 
legal grounds do there exist to the retention of an enrichment? New Art. 1303-1 CC states that 
“[a]n enrichment is unjustified where it stems neither from the fulfilment of an obligation by the 
person impoverished nor from his intention to confer a gratuitous benefit”. But this is evidently 
too narrow: it might be a sufficient condition but certainly not a necessary one. Any time a shift 
of wealth is actively brought about, or passively ratified, by the legal order – whether through a 
manifestation of will of the parties or not – the enrichment will not be unjustified and can be 
retained. If, for example, a party is subrogated to the rights of another; or ownership is acquired 
through the rules of occupatio, specificatio, accessio, etc, no action in unjustified enrichment will lie: one 
party is incontrovertibly enriched at the expense of the other but not in violation of the provisions 
of the legal order, hence “justifiably”.59 
 Although the “cause” of the enrichment can be any juridical act (an expression of will 
intended to have legal consequences) – e.g. a contract, a will, a judgement – or indeed, as 
mentioned, any provision of the law that is not mediated through a juridical act between the parties, 
in practice much of the discussion focuses on contracts: the most common reason why an action 
will be refused is because of the existence of a valid contract which sanctions the enrichment. 
Here, it must be pointed out that what French law insists on, consonant with the name of the 
doctrine, is that the enrichment should be unjustified. The impoverishment need not be.60 In 
situations where the legal basis under which the shift of wealth took place is a contract between 
the parties, the legal ground for the enrichment will, by construction (and at least initially), also be 
that for the other party’s impoverishment. But in situations of indirect enrichment this will not be 
so. In such cases French law has no difficulty with the view that the defendant’s enrichment can 
be justified by a contract concluded with a third party. A common scenario is where C transfers a 
benefit to T pursuant to a contract. D, who is not party to the deal with C, benefits indirectly from 
the contract. Because T cannot, or cannot conveniently, be sued, C turns his attention to D and 
claims against him in unjustified enrichment. While there are a number of hurdles on his way to 
recovery (including the doctrine of subsidiarity and the existence of a legal ground justifying the 
enrichment as between T and D), French law is – contrary to most legal systems – happy in 
principle to entertain such claims. The fact that B’s impoverishment is justified is irrelevant.  
 
 
                                                 
58 G Ripert and R Teisseire, “Essai d’une théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause en droit civil français”, 3 Revue 
trimestrielle de droit civil (1904) 727, 791. 
59 One point that does not appear to have been noticed by French scholars is that there exists an ambiguity concerning 
the nature of legal bases. Sometimes they refer to an objective bond, such as contract or judgement; other times, to 
the subjective disposition of the claimant (e.g. animus donandi). These operate on two different levels. Most times they 
will be the flipside one of the other: when I pay to discharge my contractual debt, I normally – freely – intend 
(subjectively) to extinguish the bond by which I am (objectively) tied. But at times the tension will surface, as in the 
case of payment of another’s debt under duress, where there does exist an obligation but no unvitiated intention to 
discharge it. This raises an intriguing question: when I freely pay to discharge my contractual debt, is the “just factor” 
the contractual obligation itself or rather my free intention to pay the debt? 
60 A strand of juridical writing does admittedly insist on there being a “cause” to the impoverishment, and the idea 
can be seen to surface in case law as well; but Philippe Conte has convincingly argued that this is wrong, using the 
word cause in a different sense and really being concerned with considerations of fault and risk-taking (see post Part 
D(2)(c)): Conte (supra n 54), 232ff. 
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ii) subsidiarity 
Very difficult to disentangle in practice, if in principle entirely distinct, is the doctrine known as 
the “subsidiarity” of unjustified enrichment according to which (to quote Aubry and Rau’s formula 
which the Court of Cassation made its own) the claimant should not already “have at his disposal 
… an action arising from a contract, a quasi-contract, a delict or a quasi-delict” if he is to be 
allowed to sue in unjustified enrichment.61 The rule is difficult both to understand and, even more 
so, to justify. It is not clear what it means; to what extent courts give effect to it; or indeed whether, 
when properly understood, there is any room for it in the modern law. 
 The doctrine requires that there should be no other action – sometimes described by 
scholars as de droit commun, “at common law”, as if the (equitable?) actio de in rem verso were an 
extraordinary remedy –62 open to the claimant “in order to obtain what belongs to him or is owed 
to him”.63 Whatever exactly the latter point refers to, it is at least certain that it is not the same as 
“any action against the defendant”. Thus, to use an example where the doctrine of subsidiarity has 
been invoked, the claimant who seeks to have the other party disgorge the profit made pursuant 
to a wrong is not claiming the same thing as delictual damages for loss caused by the wrong in 
question: accordingly, subsidiarity has no application here. It must be, in substance if not form, 
the same remedy that is being thought. 
 Of course, for the doctrine to step in, there should be an unjustified enrichment in the first 
place. This requirement, plain though it might be, disposes of a considerable number of claims 
examined by legal scholars under the heading of “subsidiarity”. Thus, if a claimant can bring a rei 
vindicatio, by definition ownership has not passed and the defendant is not enriched by the value 
of the thing: no consideration of subsidiarity can even get off the ground. Again, and more 
significantly, whenever the benefit was transferred pursuant to a valid contract, the enrichment 
will not be unjustified and, here too, no consideration of subsidiarity arises in the first place. 
Accordingly, it is absurd to say that the reason why the victim of a bad deal cannot sidestep the 
contract and sue in unjustified enrichment for the fact that the other party was enriched at his 
expense is because he has a contractual action which takes precedence (and denies him a remedy): 
it is because the enrichment of the other party is in principle condoned by the legal order. It is 
justified. In all these cases there is no “competition” between the actio de in rem verso and another 
action because the former has not even prima facie arisen on the facts.  
When a genuine overlap exists, the claimant would ordinarily want to give priority to the 
non-enrichment action anyway because the “double ceiling” of de in rem verso makes it a 
comparatively unattractive option.64 The main difficulty concerns situations where the “priority” 
(i.e. non-enrichment) action is barred on the facts, for instance because of limitation periods. Let 
us assume that D committed a wrong towards C and C failed to sue in time. In such circumstances 
French law accepts without difficulty that C is impoverished (by the amount of damages he was 
entitled to) and D enriched by the same measure; but it is clear that C cannot – and rightly so – 
elect to sue D on the basis of unjustified enrichment, taking advantage of a longer limitation period. 
Is that, however, because the action in unjustified enrichment is “subsidiary” to that in delict which 
should be turned to, despite its failing in the particular instance, insofar as it provides the normal 
avenue to recover those damages (even if, by construction, they are not claimed qua delictual 
damages)? This might be the usual answer, but there are in fact two other, and well-grounded, 
                                                 
61 Post n 45, cited again verbatim by Court of Cassation in its judgement of 12 May 1914 (post n 57). 
62 While it is difficult to justify in any principled way that the post-1892 judge-made remedy was, once it had come 
into existence, of a different nature from all other private-law doctrines, it is impossible to deny that its extra-ordinary 
(sometimes rephrased as extra-codal) character has been a key undercurrent of legal analysis in respect of the actio de 
in rem verso, used to justify the subservient role to which it has been consigned. In that sense at least, its being put on 
a statutory basis in the Reform is extremely significant: it will no longer be possible to rely on the argument – or 
perhaps the unarticulated, yet very real, sense – that it is somehow subordinate to other sources of obligations. 
63 This too is from Aubry and Rau (ante n 45). 
64 Post Part F(3)(a). 
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bases which could justify the same outcome without resorting to the additional, ad hoc, doctrine of 
subsidiarity.  
 One would simply be to say that unjustified enrichment, like indeed any other principle of 
liability, cannot be used to stultify mandatory rules of law.65 When it is the clear purpose of an 
established rule that the defendant should be able to retain the benefit claimed by the other party, 
no action in unjustified enrichment will be entertained: as Lionel Smith puts it, “the law of 
unjustified enrichment is not supposed to contradict the effect of other legal institutions … [It] 
must yield to the positive dispositions and also to the negative implications of those other legal 
institutions”.66 It is for the same reason that, for instance, a party cannot normally sue in delict 
when a risk that was excluded by a contract, with the approval of the law, materialises through the 
other party’s negligence: this does not make delict “subsidiary” to contract; it simply prevents one 
party from, in Nicholas’ words, “subvert[ing] an existing rule of law directed to the matter in 
issue”.67 In that sense, the anti-stultification principle – a “meta-rule” of law, i.e. one that deals 
with the relationship between two or more rules which are prima facie applicable – might be no 
more than an outworking of the principle that specialia generalibus derogant: the reason why the 
specific rule prevails over the general one is because we can safely assume that it was intended to 
apply in derogation of the broader doctrine (failing which it would lose its reason for being). The 
other basis, which is not entirely distinct from the first, would be to say that the enrichment 
allegedly caught by the subsidiarity rule was in fact – indirectly – justified, meaning again that no 
question of its being reversible ever arose: by terminating the action in delict, the legal order 
decreed that the defendant could now retain the benefit: a decision that, again, would be stultified 
– literally, made a fool of – if it could be claimed through a different route. 
 When all instances where it has been invoked have been considered, it seems that there 
only exists one – very specific – actual application of the doctrine of subsidiarity. It refers to the 
case of a third party receiving a benefit under a contract to which, by construction, he is not a 
party. If (but only if) his counterparty is insolvent, French law allows, subject naturally to all other 
requirements of liability being met, the party who has provided the benefit to leapfrog his 
contractual counterparty and sue the third party to the extent of his enrichment. Only if one action 
(the one in contract against the direct enrichee) is unavailable is the claimant allowed to use that 
in unjustified enrichment to recover against a remote enrichee: this rule can properly be described 
as working out a relationship of subsidiarity – i.e. support, reserve –68 between the actions. 
Unsurprisingly this rule is regarded as highly controversial, since it amounts to making third parties 
at least partial guarantors of contractual debts and therefore undermines – indeed, stultifies – the 
allocation of risks that the contract had operated between the parties.69 It is hard to resist the view 
that it should be abolished; to the extent that it remains, however, it should be given a different, 
and much more specific, name. Outside of it, the doctrine known as subsidiarity should be 
recognised as having no independent existence and be removed from the law’s toolbox. 
 
(c) Risk-taking, personal interest and fault 
 
Beyond the above, sometimes referred to as, respectively, the “material” and “juridical elements” 
of the action in unjustified enrichment, a further set of rules – which did not feature in Aubry and 
Rau’s formula or earlier case-law – was gradually developed by courts, namely, the twin principles 
                                                 
65 Rather than stultification, French scholars would rather speak of “fraud of the law” (fraus legis). 
66 Smith (supra n 21), 613.  
67 B Nicholas, “Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law”, 36 Tulane Law Review (1962), 605, 634. 
68 OED, q.v. “subsidiary”. 
69 German law would bar an action on the basis of the exclusionary halo surrounding the Leistungskondiktion and 
English law because “it would undermine the contractual arrangements between the parties” (MacDonald v 
Costello [2011] EWCA Civ 930; [2012] QB 244 at [23]). A better solution is probably to have a robust view of the 
justification of the enrichment: for instance, in the absence of contract, a liberal intention as between the counterparty 
and the third party suffices to justify the latter’s receipt of a benefit vis-à-vis the claimant.  
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that the claimant must not have acted “at his own risk” (à ses risques et périls) or “in his own interest” 
(dans son intérêt personnel), and that he should not have been at fault. However nothing was ever clear 
with these requirements, known as the “moral elements” of enrichment claims: whether they really 
existed; how they related to one another (indeed whether the former was a single doctrine or two 
different, albeit related, ones); what their rationales were; and what effect they had. Again, because 
of the obvious overlap, they are best taken together. 
 The recent codification now provides us with the stable starting point of a statutory 
provision, where the first two requirements have been combined and brought together with the 
third in a single article: 
 
Art. 1303-2. Compensation is excluded where the impoverishment stems from an act effected by 
the impoverished person with a view to personal profit. 
 
Compensation may be reduced by the court if the impoverishment stems from the fault of the 
person impoverished. 
 
We will examine them in reverse order. 
 
i) fault 
Following a period of hesitancy, where courts oscillated between making fault irrelevant, barring 
the claimant’s action in case of serious fault only, and making all fautes a bar to the action,70 the 
role of fault in unjustified enrichment has now been aligned with that in restitution of undue 
payments. Accordingly what was said about fault earlier remains relevant. Here too, the shift from 
a counter-claim in civil liability – for an ill-identified loss – rolled up with the claim in enrichment 
without ground, to a “balance of equities” focusing, not on the consequences of the claimant’s act, 
but on the conduct itself (and allowing courts to fine-tune the scope of the defendant’s liability), 
only solves one problem by creating a greater one. Here too, the transparent aim of the doctrine 
is to protect good-faith reliance on the security of receipts: a commendable objective, but one that 
should be pursued directly rather than in this indirect, and highly inefficient, manner. And here 
too, fault has never been defined. 
Until 2016 most examples would have concerned the provision of services in the 
(negligently) mistaken belief that performance was owed to the defendant, but this will now be 
dealt with as part of recovery of undue payment. The underlying issue here – which remains after 
the change – is how to valuate (and determine the scope of liability for the receipt of) a benefit 
that was never bargained for and cannot be returned in kind, to the effect that the defendant might 
be left – in a concrete sense at least – worse off after having to pay the value of the service than 
he was before receiving it. While French law never developed a clear set of principles in respect of 
the restitution of services, either as part of enrichissement sans cause or restitutions after avoidance of 
contract, the dominant view is clearly that what matters is the objective value of the service at the 
time it was originally received.71 This is extremely favourable to the claimant, denying both what 
English law calls “subjective devaluation” and the idea that so-called “pure services” do not 
represent, at least in principle, an enrichment. Of course, if the service was deliberately imposed 
on the defendant in the hope of being paid despite the lack of agreement, the claimant will be 
regarded as having acted “with a view to personal profit” and will be denied recovery;72 but if it 
was conferred in the mistaken belief that it was owed then, in principle, the claimant will be entitled 
to recover the full objective (market) value, regardless of whether the defendant needed or wanted 
it. This is a striking result, most probably wrong as a matter of principle. Here the fault principle, 
                                                 
70 The Catala project would have barred the claimant’s action in case of serious fault (faute grave) only. 
71 Deshayes, Genicon and Laithier (supra n 33), 826; D Verse, “Improvements and Enrichment: A Comparative 
Analysis”, [1998] RLR 85, 87-8; J Ghestin, G Loiseau and YM Serinet, La formation du contrat, vol. 2: L’objet et la cause – 
Les nullités (4th ed, LGDJ, Paris, 2013), §2920. The latter point is now made clear by Art 1352-8 CC. This is independent 
(when applicable) of any price put on it by a contract that was later avoided. 
72 See section immediately below. 
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with its apportionment of liability, will allow courts to mitigate any undue hardship which it might 
cause; and it is difficult not to suspect that the provision will be used even when the claimant made 
a reasonable mistake.73 
 As previously explained, the requirement of fault – or lack thereof – should be done away 
with, and replaced with doctrines which address the various underlying issues, rather than defuse 
them by allowing judges to do (what they perceive to be) justice on the facts of the case: doctrines 
concerning change of position, the valuation of services (generalising the principles already 
underpinning rules such as Art. 555 CC), illegality, etc.  
 
ii) self-seeking conduct and incidental benefits 
The claimant will also not be able to claim if he acted “with a view to personal profit” (Art. 1303-
2 CC), the new formulation of acting “at his own risk” or “in his own interest”. Even though it is 
broader (as the above example shows), this provision covers mainly what English law would call 
“incidental benefits” received by others. Neither system has worked out convincingly why these 
should be excluded, even though we all intuit that they should. Perhaps it is simply an application 
of the principle that volenti not fit iniuria: the person who freely consents to parting with the benefit 
without reciprocation, not believing that he is obliged to, cannot complain that he finds himself 
impoverished. In French law, it has been argued (as indeed in the case of faute) that self-seeking 
conduct barred the action because it was the “cause” of the impoverishment. But this is wrong on 
at least two counts: first, it does not matter according to principle whether the impoverishment is 
caused or not; secondly, it uses the word cause in a very different sense from the ordinary one of 
legal ground. What it says is that the parting away with the benefit has a factual explanation for 
why it happened: but in that sense, of course, all impoverishments have a cause.  
 
(d) Lack of legal basis, unjust factors and French law 
 
Where does this leave French law in respect of the comparative debate concerning the role of legal 
grounds and unjust factors in the reversibility of enrichments? As is well known, it has become 
increasingly accepted over the last decades that the crude opposition traditionally drawn between 
the “unjust factors” approach of the common law – which assumes that a shift of wealth should, 
by default, stand and looks for reasons to reverse the enrichment – and the sine causa approach of 
the civilian tradition – which will not condone the swelling of one party’s assets at the expense of 
the other unless it can point to a positive reason for its retention – is a false dichotomy. Perhaps 
inevitably, all legal systems do rely both on reasons for restitution and reasons for retention.74 This 
is true of French law too. 
 It is often assumed that French law, as indeed the very name of its general enrichment 
principle (enrichissement sans cause, enrichissement injustifié) would seem to give away, is firmly in the sine 
causa camp of the civilian tradition. In one sense, of course, this is true: the claim in unjustified 
enrichment expressly relies on legal bases for the retention of the benefit, making no explicit use 
of any English-style unjust factors. But the observation must be seriously nuanced on at least two 
counts. The first is that, as pointed out several times, the heart of the law of unjustified enrichment 
is occupied by the doctrine of recovery of undue transfers where, as was seen, liability revolves – 
explicitly or implicitly – around the unjust factors of mistake and duress. Rightly understood, i.e. 
as a mechanism to restore benefits transferred because the claimant believed he was obliged to pay 
an obligation which did not in fact exist, error is inherent to the claimant’s cause of action, which 
                                                 
73 Beyond negligence in being mistaken about the “owing-ness” of a service, fault has also been found in situations 
where it was wrongful of the claimant to confer the benefit in the first place: an example being the case of a farmer 
who continued to occupy land after he had been ordered by a court to leave, and improved it thereafter (Cass. Soc., 
18 March 1854, JCP 1954. II. 8169). 
74 See, in particular, L Smith, “Demystifying Juristic Reasons” 45 Canadian Business Law Journal (2007), 281, 304: “I 
have suggested that every legal system can and does mix the two approaches”. 
 19 
is the very reason why it does not have to be specifically pleaded. Still within recovery of undue 
payment (even though, as was explained, it should properly be part of the general enrichment 
action, precisely because there was no mistake), duress is a ground for recovery when the claimant 
knowingly paid another’s debt.75  
 As to enrichissement injustifié narrowly so called, the requirement of Art. 1303-2 al. 1 overlaps 
to a significant extent with absence of mistake or duress: he who acted “with a view to personal 
profit” knew that he was under no obligation to benefit the other party and nonetheless acted 
freely to confer the benefit on him. This so-called “moral element” set out by French law plays a 
role which, in English law, would be devoted to unjust factors: the fact that its presence is 
indispensable to avoid overreach suggests that the role of reasons to return a benefit can never be 
eradicated, even in systems which do not make any room for it on the surface.  
 
E. FRENCH ENRICHMENT LAW AND THE  
WILBURG/VON CAEMMERER TAXONOMY 
  
Given its predominance in comparative scholarship it is interesting to map at least briefly the 
above developments onto the Wilburg/von Caemmerer taxonomy, originally devised in the 
context of Austrian and German scholarship but which, it is often argued, provides a universal 
map to the law of unjustified enrichment.76 
This map of enrichment law first divides (following §812 BGB) unjustified enrichment 
between enrichment by performance (Leistung) and enrichment in “any other way”, then the latter 
– in a non-exhaustive way – between : (i) interference with the claimant’s right, corresponding (in 
an imperfect way) to what English law calls “restitution for wrongs”; (ii) unauthorized expenditure 




The division between Leistungskondiktion and Nichtleistungskondiktionen immediately echoes that 
between the recovery of undue payment and (residual) unjustified enrichment in French law. 
Whilst the similarities are very real, there are several important differences between the two 
systems: 
(i) The principal difference is that the concepts of Leistung and paiement, while overlapping 
considerably and undoubtedly centring on the same core, have different scopes. For the most part, 
recovery of undue payment is narrower than the Leistungskondiktion. A paiement is only one type of 
Leistung; it is restricted to performances done with the specific purpose of extinguishing an 
obligation (solvendi causa) and, until 2016, excluded the provision of services. The German doctrine, 
on the other hand, extends to performances underpinned by other purposes (or causae), in 
particular what Roman law would have included under the condictio causa data causa non secuta (which 
under French law would go to the general enrichment claim). 
However, paiement de l’indu is wider in at least one respect, which is that it includes cases of 
mistaken payment of another’s debt which, in the Wilburg/von Caemmerer taxonomy, would 
pertain to the Rückgriffs-, not the Leistungskondiktion. If A pays B’s debt to C believing it to be its 
own, under French law A can recover from C in undue payment. It does not matter that there 
                                                 
75 Ante Part C(2)(a). 
76 W Wilburg, Die Lehre von der ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung nach österreichischem und deutschem Recht (Leuschner & Lubensky, 
Graz, 1934); E von Caemmerer, “Bereicherung und unerlaubte Handlung” in Hans Dölle et al. (eds), Festschrift für Ernst 
Rabel, vol. 1 (Mohr, Tu ̈bingen, 1954), 333. 
77 Not all instances of unjustified enrichment recognised in French law would map onto this taxonomy, in particular 
cases of enrichment ex alieno contractu, which represent an area of the law where French law is more open than German 
(or English) law, allowing in principle leapfrogging in cases where the direct enrichee is insolvent and the gain of the 
indirect enrichee is not justified by a legal ground between himself and the immediate enrichee. 
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exists a legal basis to C’s enrichment, namely, B’s debt (which in German law would bar the 
Leistungskondiktion): all that matters for the purpose of the action is that A sought to extinguish a 
debt – his own – which did not exist.  
(ii) A second structural difference is that, under the Wilburg/von Caemmerer taxonomy, 
enrichment by performance is regarded as a constituent part (indeed the main one) of unjustified 
enrichment whereas, as was seen, a paradox of French law is that the equally central doctrine of 
restitution of undue payments falls outside the boundaries of the general action. As was just seen, 
this is not merely presentational and has substantive consequences. 
(iii) Finally, French law does not subscribe to the strong exclusionary effect of the 
Leistungskondiktion according to which the existence of a Leistung between A and B normally 
excludes any non-Leistung-based actions (whoever the parties might be) based on the enrichment 
provided by the Leistung. There is no such “halo” of undue payment on residual unjustified 




Enrichment by wrongdoing poses difficulty to French law, whether it be regarded – like the 
Eingriffskondiktion in Germany – as part of the law of unjustified enrichment or – as is the dominant 
view in England – the law of civil wrongs. If the former, the requirement of impoverishment 
excludes in principle all cases where the benefit accrued from a third party and disgorgement 
(giving “up” rather than giving “back”) is sought; if the latter, the restriction of monetary damages 
to compensatory damages, as orthodoxy continues to have it, excludes the award of gain-based, as 
opposed to loss-based, damages.  
Yet, it would be incorrect to say that there is no such thing as restitution for wrongs in 
French law. Both bodies of law do in fact accommodate such situations, albeit in no principled 
way. On the side of the law of delict (responsabilité extra-contractuelle), it has long been the case that 
courts might regard the defendant’s benefit as the flipside of the claimant’s loss. This allows them 
to grant what is effectively disgorgement of profits by deeming it – sometimes against all 
plausibility – to correspond to a loss wrongfully caused. More recently, the Law of 29 October 
2007 on Anti-counterfeiting has made gain-based awards openly possible by providing that, in case 
of violations of specific intellectual property rights, the court should “take into account … profits 
made by the injuring party” when determining quantum of damages.78  
On the side of unjustified enrichment, there also exists a number of cases where courts have 
granted an indemnity, based on what English lawyers would call a reasonable licence fee, to 
claimants whose property had been used without permission. These would be difficult to square 
with principle because the fee would only correspond to the claimant’s loss and the defendant’s 
gain if they had been prepared to negotiate, which ordinarily will be speculative at best; yet their 
existence cannot be denied. More importantly, the new provision in Art. 1303-4 CC, which swaps 
around the basis of recovery in case of bad-faith enrichees, would seem to open the door to a fully 
fledged principle of disgorgement of profits when the defendant received a benefit which he knew 
he was not entitled to keep.79 It is however unclear whether this was even contemplated by the 
draftsmen, and little can be said about this provision with confidence until courts begin to interpret 





                                                 
78 Code de la propriété intellectuelle, Art. L331-1-3; and see generally M Séjean, “The Disgorgement of Illicit Profits 
in French Law”, in E Hondius and A Janssen (eds), Disgorgement of Profits: Gain-Based Remedies Throughout the World 
(Springer, Cham, 2015), 121. 




Imposed enrichment, as common lawyers would say, is dealt with through several doctrines in 
French law, but not the general action for unjustified enrichment. The most common types of 
situations are dealt with by specific provisions of the Code pertaining to property law, the law of 
succession or matrimonial regimes: thus Art. 555 deals with expenses incurred by the defendant 
when making “plantings, constructions and works” with his own materials on the claimant’s land; 
Art. 599 al. 2 with usufructuraries who returns a thing improved when their right expires; Art. 861 
with donees who have to return gifts; Art. 1469 with former spouses who divide the matrimonial 
property, etc. These provisions sometimes allow restitution of an imposed enrichment; the details 
of the rules are complex and do not belong here.  
 Besides these lies the actio negotiorum gestorum. This institution normally requires the claimant 
to have acted with an altruistic purpose (i.e. for the benefit of the defendant, but short of liberal 
intent); however French courts have long known and used a form of analogous action known as 
“anomalous negotiorum gestio” (gestion d’affaire anormale), allowing recovery in situations where the 
gestor acted for his own benefit – for instance a genealogist who finds out that someone is entitled 
to an inheritance and, having revealed the fact to the stranger, seeks remuneration for his work. 
This was a vehicle used by French courts to grant remedies for what was in effect unjustified 
enrichment long before the Boudier case. It is ordinarily believed to have been laid to rest following 
the recognition of the new action, but Philippe Remy has shown that it was not, and has continued 
to be pressed into service by courts in an ad hoc fashion to deal with situations coming under the 
Verwendungskondiktion.80 
Apart from these, it is unlikely that any claim would lie under the general enrichment action. 
Unless the claimant believed himself to be obliged to act in the way which enriched the claimant 
– in which case this would be a Leistungs-, not Verwendungskondiktion, he most likely acted in his 




Finally, payment of another’s debt comes within the purview of recovery of undue payment, if 
perhaps an overly extensive understanding of the doctrine.81 Of course, in French as in German 
law, subrogation (subrogation personnelle) and negotiorum gestio might also be used to obtain recovery 
when the payment was not intended as a liberality towards the real debtor.  
 






We turn to finish to the measure of restitutionary recovery. More than other legal systems, French 
law draws a sharp distinction (inherited from the Roman division between the condictio indebiti and 
the condictio furtiva) between good-faith and bad-faith recipients, which the Ordonnance has now 
extended from undue payment to unjustified enrichment. In this context, bad faith means the 
                                                 
80 P Remy, “Les restitutions dans un système de quasi-contrats : l’expérience française”, in L Vacca (ed), Arricchimento 
ingiustificato e ripetizione dell’indebito (Giappichelli, Turin, 2005), 73, 94). The same scenario has given rise to successful 
actions in unjustified enrichment: see Goré (supra n 42), 127. The actio negotiorum gestorum utilis must be abolished from 
judicial practice: not only does it properly belong in the general action for unjustified enrichment; it has no normative 
underpinning given that it does not share the requirement which is at the core of – and gives validity to – what is 
already a controversial doctrine. 
81 Ante Part C(2)(a). 
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knowledge that one was not entitled to receive (or is not entitled to retain) the benefit received; 
good faith – which is presumed – simply being the absence of such knowledge.  
 The obligation that lies on the defendant found liable under the former doctrine is 
described as one of “restitution” (restitution, formerly called répétition i.e. “demand back”, return, 
recovery). The content of this obligation is dealt with as part of a new chapter in the Code headed 
“restitutions” (Arts 1352 – 1352-9 CC). The scope of this chapter is intriguing, dealing as it does 
with situations as varied as restitutions under failed contracts and the (proprietary) rei vindicatio; but 
not – remarkably – unjustified enrichment, which has its own set of provisions within the chapter 
on “other sources of obligations”. Remarkably the obligation to give up a benefit under the claim 
in unjustified enrichment is referred to as one of indemnisation (indemnification, compensation) not 
“restitution”,82 even though the latter word is also used in this context. The coexistence of two 
different sets of rules and terminologies is significant, if only insofar as it suggests that the two 
doctrines might in fact be underpinned by different principles, at least in part. 
 
(b) The primacy of restitution in kind.  
 
The first point to mention is that French law – like German law – holds strongly to the principle 
of primacy of restitution in kind. It is the very thing that was transferred, or shifted, without a 
“legitimate cause” which must be restored, returned, repeated, restituted (or, in the case of 
fungibles, the same quantity of the same quality). Only if this is impossible does the obligation 
morph into one of returning its value. This will seem surprising from an English perspective, but 
is in fact part of a broader paradigm within the French law of obligations whereby, at least in 
principle, remedies in kind take precedence:83 not simply restitution en nature of unjustified 
enrichment but also specific performance of contractual obligations and even réparation en nature in 
the law of delict.  
 Of course this principle assumes that restoration in kind is not simply practically possible 
in the instant case, but meaningful in the first place. Accordingly it excludes services, which are 
inherently incapable of being restituted in kind, and also, through the provision of Art. 1352, 
money. On the other hand it applies not only to things capable of being vindicated but also to 
choses de genre (unascertained movable property): to put the same point differently, restitution in 
kind need not be in specie (i.e. the specific thing itself); it can be in genere (a thing of the same type).  
 The rule applies both to undue payment and unjustified enrichment; and restitution in kind 
can not only be demanded – within its scope of application – by the claimant but, it seems, also 
imposed on him, even if he has no interest in recovering the thing itself. Importantly, the primacy 
of restitution in kind applies not simply to things which are being vindicated but also to those 
which are “condicted”: the defendant who has acquired ownership will be required to transfer it 
back, along with possession, to the successful claimant.  
 
(c) Three paradigms 
 
In order to understand their underlying logic, it is helpful to map the details of recovery under 
undue payment and unjustified enrichment against three distinct (albeit overlapping) models of 
liability.  
 The first paradigm is one of unjustified enrichment: as the name suggests, the aim here is to 
make the defendant give up to the claimant a gain that is connected to him and which the 
defendant ought not to be retaining. The focus in this model is on the defendant’s enrichment. 
                                                 
82 Cf Marie Malaurie, Les restitutions en droit civil (Cujas, Paris, 1991), 50 who distinguishes the actio de in rem verso from 
restitution, the former being conceived of as a loss-based action (where, unlike tort, the claimant might receive less 
than his loss because the defendant was not at fault). 
83 In the field of the condictio indebiti, Roman law simply asserted that “recovery is either of what is actually given or its 
value in money” [“aut ipsum aut tantundem repetitur”] (D.12.6.7 [Pomponius, Sabinus, book 9; tr. Pennsylvania Digest]). 
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While the time at which this is assessed is not dictated by analytical necessity, it is more logical to 
look at the enrichment that exists at the time of litispendence (or judgement or even, conceivably, 
execution of the judgement): this is in the nature of a claim that asserts, at the time it is brought, 
“give up to me what you should not be having in bonis!”84 
 The second paradigm is that of unjustified impoverishment. This is the flipside of the above 
and looks to the claimant’s loss insofar as it is regarded by the law as sufficiently connected with 
the defendant (“make up to me what I should still be having!”). Here too, we will be interested at 
least prima facie in the surviving impoverishment. While this paradigm seems much less intuitive 
than the previous one in a field described as “unjustified enrichment”, the very fact that the 
ordinary measure of recovery under enrichissement sans cause has always been, in French law, the 
lesser of the defendant’s enrichment and the claimant’s impoverishment (the so-called rule of 
double plafond i.e. “double ceiling”) suggests that it has, as a starting point, equal significance in terms 
of the measure of recovery.  
 Finally, the third paradigm is that of restitution, in the etymological sense of “the action of 
restoring or giving back something to its proper owner”.85 In core cases, namely corporeal things 
which are not perishable and can be restituted in the same condition as they were received, the 
model will both be self-explanatory and clearly distinguished from the other two: “give back to me 
what you unduly received from me!”. Accordingly, if the thing is later depleted, damaged, 
destroyed, lost, etc., under the enrichment paradigm the defendant will only have to return – in 
kind or value – what is still in his hands, whereas on the restitution paradigm he would still be 
obliged to return the thing itself – or indeed its value if this has become impossible.  
 However the line between the two will often be blurred because the sheer passing of time 
is enough to transform the thing transferred: it will grow, wither, produce fruits etc. Here the basic 
principle (which can be difficult to apply in practice, especially when it comes to fruits) should be 
that the restitutionary model demands the return of whatever the claimant would have in his hands 
at the time the claim is brought if the thing had never been transferred to the other party. Thus it 
includes fruits which would have accrued in any event (and not been consumed); but it excludes 
all the benefits (natural fruits, legal fruits, improvements) as well as detriments (“degradations or 
deteriorations”, as Art. 1352-1 CC puts them) which are attributable to the defendant. If he is 
required to restore either more or less than that, this constitutes a departure from the restitutionary 
paradigm. 
 
2. Recovery of undue payments  
 
(a) Good-faith recipients 
 
The measure of recovery under undue payment can give rise to some difficulties, but the general 
principles (leaving aside the moderating power of courts in case of fault, mentioned above) are 
straightforward enough.86 When it comes to the paradigmatic case of the receipt of a specific (non-
fungible) thing, a good-faith recipient: (i) must return the thing itself or its value at the date of 
restitution;87 (ii) is not liable for the diminution in value caused by any “degradations or 
deterioriations” to the thing, unless these were “due to his fault”;88 (iii) must only account for the 
                                                 
84 The terminology of “surviving enrichment” is well established, but it falsely suggests that this will be inferior to 
“enrichment received”, whereas the defendant might in reality have made consequential gains.  
85 OED, v° “restitution”. 
86 For the valuation of services, newly brought within the scope of the doctrine when supplied solvendi causa, see ante 
Part D(2)(c). 
87 Art. 1352 CC. 
88 Art. 1352-1 CC. It is not clear what “being at fault” could mean in that context. There is no duty of care towards 
one’s own property; and if a person (reasonably?) believed himself to be the owner of a thing, he commits no fault by 
leaving it to decay, destroying it etc. It seems that the only situation where a faute might be characterized is where the 
defendant knew, or ought to have known, that his receipt was unjustified and the thing would have to be returned. 
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price received if the thing was sold on;89 (iv) is not liable for interest;90 (v) is not liable for fruits 
taken;91 (vi) is not liable for the value of enjoyment;92 (vii) can – like the bad-faith recipient – be 
reimbursed the value of his necessary or useful expenses on the thing (subject to a moderating 
power of the court, and up to the increase in the thing’s value).93 
 This represents a combination of all three paradigms above: by default, the defendant must 
return the thing itself which he received, including any benefit that would have accrued naturally 
(restitution model). If he retains less than he received – e.g. the thing was damaged, given away or 
sold for less than its worth – he is only liable for what he still has in his assets: the enrichment 
paradigm steps in (which also accounts for the recovery of expenses). Conversely, if he is left with 
more than he originally acquired – interest received, fruits gathered but not consumed, use enjoyed, 
profitable transaction with a third party entered into – he is not liable and must only return what 
the other party has parted with: impoverishment model. (As mentioned, however, money follows 
different rules which give effect to a pure restitutionary paradigm,94 as do services.95 It is in their 
respect that we see most clearly the consequences of restitution of undue payments not being a 
species of enrichment liability, a key feature of French law.)96 
 
(b) Bad-faith recipients 
 
In Roman law, the bad-faith recipient was regarded as a thief, which made him liable to the condictio 
furtiva (and also the condictio indebiti, even though his bad faith prevented ownership from passing). 
While French law no longer follows these rules, it still treats the bad-faith recipient of an undue 
payment more harshly. Accordingly, when it comes to immovables and ascertained movable 
property, besides (i) having to return the thing itself or its value at the date of restitution;97 he (ii) 
is liable for the diminution in value caused by degradations or deteriorations;98 (iii) must account 
for the entire value of the thing at the time of restitution, if he has sold it for a lesser sum;99 (iv) is 
liable for interest;100 (v) is liable for fruits taken;101 (vi) is liable for the value of enjoyment;102 (vii) 
can recover for his expenses in the same way as the good-faith recipient.103  
 This is the mirror image of the previous case. The default paradigm is still that of restitutio. 
But the unjust enrichment paradigm steps in when the defendant retains more than the benefit 
originally received or its value: he must now restitute the increase (interest, fruits, enjoyment value, 
benefit of sale). On the other hand, if the surviving enrichment is less than the benefit originally 
                                                 
89 Art. 1352-2 al. 1 CC. Presumably, (i) by extension this would be zero if the thing was given away; (ii) by symmetry 
with the opposite situation, this is implicitly limited to situations where the price received is lower than the court-
assessed objective value of the thing. 
90 Art. 1352-7 CC. The article is unhelpfully phrased. It says that the good-faith defendant is liable for fruits from the 
point the claim is brought. But, at this point, the defendant is regarded as being in bad faith, knowing that he is not 
entitled to retain the benefit (of course he might dispute the claimant’s assertion, but by construction we are in a 
situation where the latter has won, and ignorantia iuris non excusat). Accordingly the good-faith defendant is not liable 
for fruits at all. 
91 Idem. 
92 Idem.  
93 Art. 1352-5 CC. 
94 Art. 1352-6 CC. “[I]nterest at the rate set by legislation” represents the deemed growth of money over time. 
95 Art. 1352-8 CC. 
96 The lack of clear principles in case law makes it difficult to compare the post- with the pre-2016 law, but logically 
the shift of services carried out solvendi causa from unjustified enrichment to undue payments will have meant a change 
– favourable to the claimant – from one model of liability to another. This does not appear to have been discussed. 
97 Art. 1352 CC. 
98 Art. 1352-1 CC. 
99 Art. 1352-2 al. 2 CC.  
100 Art. 1352-7 CC. 
101 Idem. 
102 Idem. 
103 Art. 1352-5 CC.  
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received (damage, unprofitable transaction with a third party), the unjust impoverishment model 
takes over and the claimant will receive the full value of what he has been deprived of, even if this 
is more than what the defendant retains. In other words, where the good-faith defendant gets the 
benefit of the model which favours him, this favour is granted to his adversary in the case of a 
bad-faith defendant. (Again, this does not apply to money and services, which are controlled 
entirely by the restitutionary paradigm). 
 
3. Unjustified enrichment 
 
The Ordonnance introduced a similar distinction between good- and bad-faith recipients in an 
area where it did not previously feature. 
 
(a) Good-faith recipients 
 
A good-faith recipient owes (subject again to the moderating power of the court if the claimant 
was at fault) an “indemnity” which is the lesser of the two sums represented by the claimant’s 
original impoverishment and the defendant’s surviving enrichment at the time the action is 
brought.104 This is the well-known rule of double plafond (“double ceiling”), which represents a 
hybrid of the enrichment and impoverishment paradigms above. This rule, which is often regarded 
by English lawyers as repugnant to the very principles of the law of unjust enrichment – even 
though it has been adopted, under the influence of French and Quebec law, in Canada and has 
also been defended in an English context –105 appears self-evident to French scholars: if it were 
not so, the claimant would receive an unjustified windfall at the defendant’s expense.106 The fact 
that enrichment is assessed at the time of litispendence means that a defence of change of position 
is built into the rule for good-faith defendants;107 it also excludes claims for consequential gains, 
insofar as they will normally exceed the value of impoverishment.108  
 
(b) Bad-faith recipients 
 
As with undue payment, the law conserves the same paradigms when it comes to bad-faith 
recipients but reverses their order. The successful claimant is now entitled to the greater of the 
two sums (his original impoverishment or his bad-faith opponent’s surviving enrichment), as 
valued at the time of judgment.109 This is a new provision, which can be traced to the Terré 
project:110 before the Reform, the bad-faith defendant was not treated differently from the good-
faith recipient (which the defendant was presumed to be). 
 If the defendant has parted, voluntarily or not, with some of the enrichment, the practical 
effect of this provision is to deny him the benefit of the defence of change of position: he will be 
liable to pay the value of the claimant’s loss, which in most cases corresponds to his own initial 
                                                 
104 Art. 1303 CC. 
105 M McInnes, The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (LexisNexis Canada, Markham [Ont.], 2014), 184-
5; A Trotter, “The Double Ceiling on Unjust Enrichment: Old Solutions for Old Problems”, [2017] CLJ 1. 
106 As mentioned most recently in the official Rapport (supra n 5), q.v. “l’enrichissement injustifié”. 
107 Again, the defendant on judicial notice that he might have to return the benefit is deemed in bad faith, hence is no 
longer able to rely on it after the beginning of judicial proceedings. 
108 A significant – if puzzling – development in the Reform is the move from nominalism to valorism in the assessment 
of claims: whatever the losing defendant must pay is the number of monetary units it takes at the time of judgment to 
transfer value equal to the indemnity calculated at an earlier date. This is puzzling not because valorism is wrong but 
because the choice between nominalism and valorism should be done in a much more general way. One direct 
consequence of this partial shift to another logic is that the impoverished claimant in unjustified enrichment is now 
treated more favourably than the manager of another’s affairs, when the opposite had always been true on account of 
the latter’s altruism (Deshayes, Laithier and Genicon (supra n 33), 560).  
109 Art. 1303-4. 
110 Terré (supra n 2), Art. 13. 
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enrichment. Indeed it is likely that this was the aim of the provision. The earlier Catala project (and 
the first draft of the Reform circulated by the Ministry of Justice in 2011) had instead addressed 
this point directly by changing the time of assessment of the enrichment, in case of bad faith, from 
litispendence to original receipt.111 However the rule has another, perhaps unexpected, effect: 
where a defendant has made consequential gains, the operation of Art. 1303-4 CC will now force 
him to disgorge them to the claimant. This need not be a bad thing based on intuitions of common 
morality, but it is puzzling given the French consensus, noted above, that the law of unjustified 
enrichment should not result in a windfall for the claimant (and it does not fit the first principles 
of the law of delict either);112 indeed it is not clear that this outcome was contemplated by the 




Even though it is in many ways no more than a footnote to the Ordonnance of 2016, the recent 
Reform of French law which it brought about is the most significant makeover of the third pillar 
of its law of obligations since 1804. By putting the general (if residual) claim for unjustified 
enrichment on a statutory footing, it has turned an action which had never managed to throw off 
the shackles of its equitable, hence extra-ordinary, character into one that stands on a par with 
other principles of liability. One might hope that this will allow courts and scholars, which had 
been meandering between extremes, to determine the rightful scope of the claim. In any event, a 
principal merit of the Reform is to provide clarity in an area of the law that had long been plagued 
by uncertainty and conflicting strands of case law. Most of the substantial changes (to the extent 
that they are in fact changes rather than lines drawn for the first time) are also to be welcome, 
limited though they might be.  
Yet, for the most part, disappointment is the dominant note: compared, in particular, with 
German law, French law remains massively underdeveloped and -conceptualised. New 
uncertainties have been introduced, for instance concerning disgorgement of profits; a transversal 
doctrine of reducing liability on the basis of an ill-defined idea of “fault” is in danger of swallowing 
the whole area under a destructive principle of remedial discretion; more generally a unique 
opportunity to eliminate the quasi-contractual category and, if not merge, at least think through 
the relationship between the general action in unjustified enrichment and the doctrine of undue 
payment, was missed. The emergence of a mature, sophisticated French law of enrichment without 
ground, capable of being a source of inspiration for other legal systems, remains a distant and 




                                                 
111 Catala (supra n 2), Art. 1339. See also Civil Code of Quebec, Art. 1495 al. 2.  
112 The official Rapport (supra n 5) explains that the rule acts as a “sanction” against bad-faith defendants. How far 
this goes towards justifying either aspect of the rule is however an open question. Both the Catala and Terré projects 
had suggested to introduce disgorgement damages in the context of the law of extra-contractual liability, but this is 
not being taken forward in the reform of civil liability currently under consideration.  
